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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After being convicted of conspiracy to commit burglary, burglary, and
misdemeanor trespass in a separate criminal case, Evin Christopher Devan filed a
petition for post-conviction relief. Mr. Devan was appointed counsel, but counsel did not
file a response to the State’s motion for summary dismissal or an amended petition. As
a result, the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Devan’s petition. Mr. Devan filed a
Notice of Appeal timely from the order dismissing his petition and subsequently filed an
I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion. The district court later denied that motion.
On appeal, Mr. Devan challenges the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion.

He

submits that the district court abused its discretion when it denied the motion because
there was a complete absence of meaningful representation by his post-conviction
counsel, and the district court denied the motion based on an improper analysis.
This reply brief is necessary to respond to the State’s arguments that there was
meaningful representation by Mr. Devan’s post-conviction counsel, Mr. Nelson, and that
Mr. Devan failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. With respect to the first
argument, the State relies on the fact that there was some communication between
Mr. Devan and Mr. Nelson, but it fails to prove how that communication made
Mr. Nelson’s representation meaningful. It also alleges facts that are not supported by
the record. With respect to the second argument, the State asserts that the district
court’s weighing of the facts alleged in the affidavit filed in support of the Rule 60(b)
motion against some of the evidence from the trial was a proper analysis.

This

argument fails because the facts supporting the Rule 60(b) motion raised a genuine
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issue of material fact and therefore an evidentiary hearing was the proper place for any
comparison of those facts to the conflicting evidence from the trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Devan’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief but are
incorporated herein by reference.
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Devan’s Rule 60(b) motion?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Devan’s Rule 60(b) Motion

A.

The State Has Failed To Show That Mr. Devan’s Post-Conviction Counsel
Provided Meaningful Representation
In the Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Devan argued that there were unique and compelling

circumstances that supported granting the Rule 60(b) motion because there was a
complete lack of meaningful representation by Mr. Devan’s post-conviction counsel—
Mr. Nelson. (App. Br., pp.9-15.) In response, the State relies on the district court’s
finding that there was some communication between Mr. Devan and Mr. Nelson.
(Resp. Br., pp.7-9.) The district court made this finding based on Mr. Devan’s affidavit
filed in support of his motion. (Augmentation, p.49.) In that affidavit, Mr. Devan stated
that he met with Mr. Nelson and his paralegal on June 18, 2015. (Augmentation, p.28.)
He said only that he “showed” Mr. Nelson the Jones affidavit and expressed concern
that the State would be filing a motion for summary dismissal. (Augmentation, p.28.)
Based on this statement and the fact that—at hearing on the motion for summary
dismissal—Mr. Nelson said he had met with Mr. Devan who said that he wanted
Mr. Nelson to file an amended petition if there were meritorious issues, the district court
said that “counsel considered [the affidavit] and determined that there was no
meritorious claim.”

(Augmentation, p.49.)

Therefore, it found that there was

“communication regarding the potential alibi.” (Augmentation, p.49.)
The State’s reliance on the district court’s finding about communication between
Mr. Devan and Mr. Nelson is problematic for several reasons. First, as argued in the
Appellant’s Brief, the fact that there was some communication between Mr. Devan and
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Mr. Nelson is not the issue. The issue is whether Mr. Nelson’s representation was
meaningful. (App. Br., pp.10-12.) The communication that took place here did not
support a finding that Mr. Nelson provided meaningful representation. Indeed, the only
thing Mr. Devan said about the Jones affidavit was that he “showed” it to Mr. Nelson.
(Augmentation, p.28.) This does not indicate that there was any sort of a dialogue or
ongoing conversation about it.

And it certainly does not indicate that Mr. Nelson

analyzed how he might use the Jones affidavit in an amended petition and thus made a
strategic decision about it. In fact, there is no indication that Mr. Nelson ever even read
the Jones affidavit.
Second, the State argues that it did not matter that Mr. Nelson failed to keep
Mr. Devan informed about the status of his case because “[o]nce Devan knew
Mr. Nelson was not going to file the Jones affidavit it was irrelevant whether he also
knew the state had filed a motion for summary dismissal. Even if Mr. Nelson had told
Devan of the motion for summary dismissal, Devan already knew that Mr. Nelson was
not going to present the Jones affidavit in response.” (Resp. Br., pp.8-9 (emphasis
added).) These alleged facts are not in the record.
There is no indication from Mr. Devan’s affidavit that Mr. Nelson ever told
Mr. Devan that he was not going to use the Jones affidavit to support an amended
petition. Mr. Devan said he showed the Jones affidavit to Mr. Nelson at their meeting
on June 18, 2015. (Augmentation, p.28.) He also told Mr. Nelson that he anticipated
the State would move for summary dismissal, but Mr. Nelson failed to tell him that the
State had already done so almost four months earlier. (Augmentation, p.28.) There is
no evidence Mr. Nelson ever told Mr. Devan he was not going to use the Jones affidavit,
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or that he was not going to file an amended petition. As such, Mr. Devan “discovered a
hearing was held,” and his case was dismissed, three weeks after the date of the
hearing on the motion for summary dismissal. (Augmentation., p.28; R., p.42.)
Therefore, on the day that Mr. Nelson met with Mr. Devan in June, it is evident
that Mr. Devan left that meeting thinking that Mr. Nelson was going to evaluate and
analyze whether the Jones affidavit could be used to support an amended petition if the
State ultimately filed a motion for summary dismissal.

(Augmentation, p.28.)

Unbeknownst to Mr. Devan, that motion had already been filed—in February.
(R., p.31.) The fact that Mr. Devan sent Mr. Nelson a copy of the Jones affidavit a few
days after their meeting also supports this assessment of the situation. (Augmentation,
p.28.) If Mr. Nelson had told Mr. Devan that he was not going to use the affidavit,
Mr. Devan would have had no reason to send him a copy of it.
Furthermore, it was likely too late for Mr. Devan to take any action on his own
even if he had been informed at that point that the State had filed the motion for
summary dismissal because the hearing took place on July 10, 2015. (R., p.42.) The
State asserts that “’[t]he crucial information was not that the state actually moved to
dismiss his petition, but that Mr. Nelson determined the Jones affidavit did not raise a
meritorious defense.”

(Resp. Br., p.8.)

However, not only is this assumption not

supported by the record, as there is no way to know whether Mr. Nelson actually read
the affidavit to determine if it raised a meritorious defense, but there is nothing in the
record to show Mr. Nelson ever communicated that “crucial information” to Mr. Devan.
Thus, the State’s argument fails.
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In denying the Rule 60(b) motion, the district court found that there was
“communication regarding the potential alibi” simply because Mr. Devan’s affidavit
indicated that he showed the Jones affidavit to Mr. Nelson at the meeting, but that is not
the standard.

(Augmentation, p.49.)

representation was meaningful.

The standard is whether Mr. Nelson’s

Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 736-37 (2010).

Mr. Nelson’s representation was not meaningful because he failed to do anything with
the Jones affidavit and kept Mr. Devan in the dark about his case. As argued in the
Appellant’s Brief, this ensured that Mr. Devan could take no steps on his own behalf
even if he disagreed with Mr. Nelson’s assessments. (App. Br., pp.10, 14.)
Had there been meaningful representation, Mr. Nelson would have used the
affidavit and clarified the claims, first and foremost. Alternatively, he would have told
Mr. Devan—long before the hearing on the motion for summary dismissal—that the
State had filed that motion, and he was not going to use the Jones affidavit to support
an amended petition. This would have allowed Mr. Devan to elect to proceed pro se
and file his own amended petition if he wanted to. But he never had that opportunity
because Mr. Nelson failed to keep him informed.1 This was not simply a “disagreement
between Devan and Mr. Nelson whether the Jones affidavit would constitute a
meritorious defense” as the State claims.

(Resp. Br., p.8.)

There could be no

“disagreement” if Mr. Nelson never told Mr. Devan what he thought.

1

This was a

Mr. Devan stated in his affidavit that he asked to be “informed of all movements” in the
case. (App. Br., p.3.) But Mr. Nelson never took any steps to comply with this request.
Mr. Nelson had a duty to “promptly comply with reasonable requests for information . . .
.” I.R.P.C. 1.4(a)(4). He also had duties to “reasonably consult with [Mr. Devan] about
the means by which [Mr. Devan’s] objectives” were to be accomplished, and to keep
Mr. Devan “reasonably informed about the status of the matter.” I.R.P.C. 1.4(a)(2)(3).
The record shows that Mr. Nelson neglected these duties.
7

complete lack of meaningful representation, as it ensured that Mr. Devan did not get an
opportunity to raise his post-conviction claims.
Finally, relying on its unsupported allegations that Mr. Nelson told Mr. Devan that
he was not going to use the Jones affidavit, the State ultimately asserts that “Devan has
merely alleged a difference of opinion with his post-conviction counsel and
disagreement with counsel is not a complete lack of meaningful representation.” (Resp.
Br., p.9.) This argument is meritless because there is no evidence Mr. Nelson ever had
such an opinion or that, if he did, Mr. Devan was ever made aware that opinion. These
are unique and compelling circumstances that support the fact that there was indeed a
complete lack of meaningful representation.

B.

The Jones Affidavit Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact, And The State
Fails To Show That The District Court’s Analysis Of The Credibility Of The
Affidavit Was Appropriate
In response to the argument that the district court abused its discretion when it

held that Mr. Devan did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, the State
justifies the district court’s analysis of the credibility of the Jones affidavit by arguing that
the district court was determining whether Mr. Devan had been prejudiced by his trial
counsel’s deficient performance. (Resp. Br., pp.9-12.) This ignores the fact that this
analysis was improper because the district court analyzed whether the facts alleged in
the Jones affidavit would suffice to exonerate Mr. Devan and, as discussed below, only
compared the facts in the Jones affidavit with evidence that supported its position that
the jury would not be persuaded by the Jones affidavit. It is also not supported by the
record because the district court never directly analyzed whether Mr. Devan was
prejudiced by his trial counsel’s performance. (Augmentation, pp.49-51.) It held that, in

8

light of other evidence from the trial, the Jones affidavit “was not reasonably likely to
alter the decision of the jury.” (Augmentation, p.51.) Finally, the State ignores the fact
that Mr. Devan based his application for post-conviction relief not only on ineffective
assistance of trial counsel but also on the fact that there was new evidence in the case,
which justified a new trial. (R., pp.5-6.) The Jones affidavit was new evidence, and it
supported the ineffective assistance claims, but Mr. Devan never had the opportunity to
clarify and develop those claims due to Mr. Nelson’s inaction.
In order to meet the second requirement of Rule 60(b), the party seeking relief
must only allege facts showing a meritorious claim in the form of a genuine issue of
material fact. “A party seeking relief from judgment under rule 60(b) must meet the
requirements of the rule and also “show, plead or present evidence of facts which, if
established, would constitute a meritorious defense to the action.” Ponderosa Paint
Mfg., Inc. v. Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 317 (Ct. App. 1994). The court in Ponderosa Paint
went on to state, “This policy recognizes that it would be an idle exercise and a waste of
judicial resources for a court to set aside a judgment if, in fact there is no genuine
justiciable controversy.”

Id. (citing Reeves v. Wisenor, 102 Idaho 271, 272 (1981);

Hearst Corp. v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10, 12 (1979).) Finally it wrote, “It would be pointless
to vacate a summary judgment and reopen the proceeding if the party seeking relief has
not shown that it can raise genuine factual issues sufficient to defeat the summary
judgment motion.” Id. at 317-18.
The United States Supreme Court has defined the standard for whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists as whether “the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
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477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

“The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of

determining whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any
genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250.
In the post-conviction context, if a genuine factual issue is presented, “an evidentiary
hearing must be conducted.” State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2007) (citation
omitted). The underlying facts alleged by the petitioner “must be regarded as true” for
purposes of summary dismissal. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250 (2009) (citation
omitted). Any disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party, and “all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.” Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009) (citation omitted).
In Ponderosa Paint, the court noted that it would “treat the Rule 60(b) motion as
essentially a reconsideration of the summary judgment motion” and “liberally view the
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to”
the party bringing the motion as that party would have been the non-moving party
originally. 125 Idaho at 318.
The district court in this case, however, did not construe the disputed facts in
favor of Mr. Devan. It looked at only some of the evidence from the trial and from that
alone determined that the facts alleged in the Jones affidavit would not be reasonably
likely to alter the decision of the jury. (Augmentation, pp.50-51.) It ignored the fact that
there was other evidence, which supported the idea that someone other than Mr. Devan
was present when the crimes were committed. Once it was evident that there was
some evidence of this nature, the district court should have held that the Jones affidavit
established a genuine issue of material fact, and Mr. Devan had satisfied the second
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requirement of Rule 60(b). Thus, the district court abused its discretion by failing to act
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with applicable standards. See
Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 380 (2010).
In response to Mr. Devan’s argument that the district court went too far when it
analyzed the credibility of the affidavit, the State argues that, “a review of the record
shows the court did not evaluate the credibility of the affidavit or otherwise abuse its
discretion when it determined that the Jones affidavit would not have presented a
genuine issue of material fact such that it would defeat the state’s motion for summary
dismissal.” (Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) It asserts that, “the court accepted the allegations as
true and applied the correct legal standard in concluding the allegations, even if
presented to the jury, would not reasonably have altered the outcome of the trial.”
(Resp. Br., p.11.)
However, “credibility” means “[t]he quality that makes something (as a witness or
evidence) worthy of belief.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 423 (9th ed. 2009). Thus, when the
district court compared the affidavit with the evidence from the trial, it analyzed “whether
it would suffice to exonerate Mr. Devan on the burglary charge” by delving into certain
evidence from the trial and comparing that evidence to the affidavit. (Augmentation,
pp.50-51; App. Br., p.16.) Thus it held that the facts in the Jones affidavit were not
“worthy of belief” when compared to some of the trial testimony and other evidence.
(Augmentation, pp.49-51.) Therefore, the district court did evaluate the credibility of the
affidavit; it determined that, in light of some of the evidence from the trial, the jury would
not have believed the contents of the affidavit.
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But in fact, as discussed below, there was a great deal of evidence from the
trial—which the district court failed to consider—that actually supported the facts alleged
in the Jones affidavit. In its analysis of whether the affidavit established a genuine issue
of material fact, the district court implicitly took judicial notice of the trial transcript.
(Augmentation, pp.50-51.) And the State argues that this analysis was appropriate.
(Resp. Br., p.11.)

As such, a motion to augment the record on appeal with the trial

transcript from the underlying case has been filed contemporaneously with this brief. A
brief review of that transcript shows that, contrary to the district court’s conclusion that
the Jones affidavit “was not reasonably likely to alter the outcome of the trial,” there was
evidence that supported the facts alleged in the Jones affidavit.2 Indeed, such a review
shows that the district court chose only evidence that supported its finding and ignored
evidence that did not.
In its order denying Mr. Devan’s Rule 60(b) motion, the district court relied on
the fact that the victim in the case, Karl Riebe, identified a Ford Expedition at the scene
of the crime that was later located at a motel where Mr. Devan was staying.
(Augmentation, p.50.)

The district court also noted that an investigating officer

discovered that the address on the registration of the Expedition matched the address
on Mr. Devan’s identification. (Augmentation, p.50.)
However, the district court ignored the fact that Mr. Devan testified that he had
allowed another man, Dana Harris, to drive that Expedition on the night of the burglary
and on previous occasions. (Trial Tr., p.515, L.24 – p.516, L.8.) The district court also
2

This is not an exhaustive list. However, it does show that there was evidence
supporting a different holding by the district court. It also shows that there was enough
conflicting and disputed evidence that an evidentiary hearing was necessary so that the
evidence could have been thoroughly reviewed and both parties could have argued.
12

ignored the fact that Gina White, a woman who worked at the motel where the
Expedition was found, testified that, although she had seen Mr. Devan drive the
Expedition, she had seen that vehicle being driven more frequently by Dana Harris.
(Trial Tr., p.485, L.9 – p.488, L.8.) Additionally, Ms. White testified that, on the day of
the alleged burglary, she had seen Mr. Harris driving the Expedition with another
individual, and Mr. Devan was not in the vehicle with them. (Trial Tr., p.488, Ls.14-20.)
The district court referenced the fact that, “[d]uring the investigation, Officers
found a recognizable shoe print in the area of the burglary where the Expedition had
been parked, and the same or similar shoe prints in the large storage shed which had
been broken into.” (Augmentation, p.50.) The district court noted that the print was
“similar to that on the shoes Petitioner was wearing when he was detained.”
(Augmentation, p.50.) But the district court ignored the fact that Mr. Devan testified that
the soles on the Nike shoes he was wearing were used on multiple types of Nike shoes,
and he had given Dana Harris some of his shoes in the past. (Trial Tr., p.518, L.12 –
p.521, L.1.) The district court also ignored the fact that the police never determined if
the shoe print matched the size of Mr. Devan’s shoe. (Trial Tr., p.344, L.17 – p.345,
L.14.)
Finally, the district court referenced the testimony of two other people implicated
in the crimes, Darrin Boren and Tiffany Jones, and said that they both identified
Mr. Devan and testified that he was present for the crimes. (Augmentation, pp.50-51.)
The district court went on to say, “The one thing that was absent from testimony of
either Tiffany Jones or Darrin Boren, or that of the investigating officers was any
implication that there was more than one ‘Evin’ present during the events in question.”
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(Augmentation, p.51.) It is true that neither one of them testified that more than one
Evin was present, but Mr. Jones’s affidavit stated that he rode in the Expedition “with
Dana with a Mexican that was named Evin or Devin.” (Augmentation, p.34.) He wrote
that this person was “bald and had no facial hair” and looked different than Mr. Devan.
(Augmentation, p.34.)
And the district court ignored the fact that when Jenny Osborn testified for the
State, she admitted that she could not identify Mr. Devan in a line-up, and she said she
thought he was “a Mexican kid” with no facial hair. (Trial Tr., p.264, L.18 – p.265, L.6,
p.270, Ls.16-25.) In discussing the accuracy of Ms. Osborn’s description, Mr. Devan’s
counsel pointed out that “she described him as a bald, clean-shaven . . . without facial
hair, Hispanic male.” (Trial Tr., p.288, Ls.4-7.) His counsel went on to argue that the
photo taken of Mr. Devan after he was arrested showed he was “clearly not that. He is
not a Hispanic male, he is not bald, and he’s not clean-shaven.” (Trial Tr., p.288, Ls.711.)
The district court also ignored the fact Mr. Boren’s testimony was suspect for
several reasons. On cross-examination, Mr. Boren acknowledged that he was unable
to give police Mr. Devan’s name at the time of being questioned upon his arrest. (Trial
Tr., p.367, L.15 – p.368, L.20.) Mr. Boren was also unable to recall if he had been
provided any photographic lineup in order to identify Mr. Devan, and further was
uncertain as to whether he was able to make a visual identification if that lineup was
provided. (Trial Tr., p.372, L.11 – p.373, L.21.) He also admitted that he was high on
methamphetamine on the night of the alleged burglary. (Trial Tr., p.370, Ls.10-18.)
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All of this shows that there was a great deal of conflicting evidence, some of
which supported the facts alleged in the Jones affidavit.

Therefore, there was a

reasonable probability that the affidavit could have changed the outcome of the trial
because a reasonable jury could have found Mr. Devan not guilty. As such, there was a
genuine issue of material fact, and an evidentiary hearing was necessary. It also shows
that the district court analyzed the credibility of the affidavit and did not construe all
reasonable inferences from the trial in Mr. Devan’s favor. Whether the Jones affidavit
could be supported or disproved with other evidence from the trial, and whether that
would in turn prove or disprove Mr. Devan’s post-conviction claims was a complex
analysis that, in light of all the conflicting trial testimony, should have been undertaken
at an evidentiary hearing.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Devan respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order
denying his Rule 60(b) motion and remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this 9th day of March, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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